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Abstract
Aid has been the principal source of development finance for the majority of
developing countries over the past few decades.  This has spawned a large literature
on the effectiveness of aid, which remains essentially inconclusive. The empirical
literature has tended to evaluate the impact of aid by including it as a variable in a
regression for the determinants of some economic performance indicator.  This
paper follows a different strand of the literature and examines the impact of aid on
public sector fiscal behaviour. Aid is in general given to the public sector, thus any
effect of aid is mediated by that sector.  We specifically address this behavioural
feature by analysing how aid revenue affects government fiscal behaviour with
respect to tax, borrowing and expenditure decisions; unlike previous contributions,
aid is endogenous in our model, which has a number of important implications. We
estimate an econometric model that differs from previous studies not only in this
respect but also by allowing domestic borrowing, in addition to aid and tax revenue,
to finance both capital and recurrent expenditure.  Structural and reduced form
equations are derived and estimated using 1956-95 time series data for Pakistan.
Results indicate, contrary to much of the literature, that only half of aid has gone to
government consumption, that it has had a slightly positive impact on public
investment and negative impact on tax effort.
Outline
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Aid, or foreign development assistance, has been a dominant feature of the relationship
between Industrial and Developing countries since the 1960s; aid receipts have been a
major source of external finance for the majority of countries in Africa and Asia since
they gained independence. The predominant nature of aid has changed considerably,
from project finance in the 1960s to adjustment support in the 1980s, but its economic
importance to recipients has remained considerable.  As late as 1993, aid revenues
were on average equivalent to some six per cent of GNP of low income countries
(excluding China and India), and almost 12 per cent of GNP for sub-Saharan African
countries on average; as virtually all aid goes to the public sector, this translates into
aid representing about half of government consumption spending in LDCs on average
(World Development Report 1995). As aid has been such an important source of
development finance, a large literature has emerged on evaluating the effects,
especially the macroeconomic impact on savings, investment and growth, of aid.
The underlying economic rationale for aid as a source of development finance can be
traced back to the two-gap model of Chenery and Strout (1966): low income countries
have insufficient domestic savings to finance the level of investment required to
achieve their target growth rates, and/or insufficient foreign exchange earnings to
finance required capital imports; these savings and foreign exchange gaps constrain
growth.  Capital inflows (of which aid is one form) are justified as, if they relax the
savings and foreign exchange constraints,  they can contribute to increased growth.
Following the early work of Griffin (1970), who posited that aid inflows may
discourage domestic savings, displace investment and be redirected into consumption
rather than investment, and for all these reasons may not increase growth rates, much
of the literature on the macroeconomic impact used simple ordinary least squares
regressions of aid on savings, investment and/or economic growth. This literature has
been comprehensively reviewed and justifiably criticised, on both theoretical and
econometric grounds, by White (1992) and others. This notwithstanding, many studies
continue to draw inferences on the impact of aid from cross-section regressions of aid
on economic indicators; in an oft cited recent study, Boone (1996) claimed that aid
increased (government) consumption but had no significant effect on raising
investment.
A core deficiency of this ‘aid-growth’ literature is that it fails to explicitly recognise
that aid is given primarily to the government, and that hence any impact of aid on the
economy will depend on government behavior, in particular how fiscal decisions on
taxation and expenditure are affected by aid revenues.  Both possible impacts have
been a widespread concern in the donor community, especially that concerning2
taxation. A relatively recent development in the literature avoids this criticism by
explicitly modelling how the impact of aid is mediated by public sector behavior.
Mosley et al (1987) and Gang and Khan (1991), picking-up on an earlier paper by
Heller (1975), model the public sector fiscal response to foreign aid inflows within a
framework where government’s maximise their utility by attaining revenue and
expenditure targets, and aid influences their ability to attain these targets. Gang and
Khan  (1991), unlike Mosley et al (1987) whose regressions were in the ‘aid-growth’
tradition, actually estimated the model, using time series data for India, and this work
has stimulated a debate on the appropriate basis on which to model public sector
behaviour in the presence of aid inflows1 This paper is a contribution to that literature.
Our major point of departure from the previous literature is that we endogenise aid.
Previous contributors have assumed that governments set revenue targets for tax and
borrowing, yet treat aid as exogenous aid.  A prime interest of previous studies is aid
fungibility, which occurs if recipients fail to use aid in the manner intended by donors:
the implicit assumption is that donors grant aid for investment purposes and fungibility
arises when recipients divert these funds into consumption uses.  As discussed in the
next section, fungibility is not a requirement of our model, although we can address
the associated concerns.  In our approach, governments have a target for aid revenue,
and this ‘expected’ revenue is incorporated into their fiscal planning; that is, when
determining revenue and expenditure allocations, aid revenue is taken into account.
Making aid endogenous does not require the assumption that recipients have control
over the aid they are allocated by donors; instead it requires that effective control over
the amount of this allocation that is actually spent. Other innovative features of our
model, notably that a budget constraint is expressed as an inequality and that domestic
borrowing is allowed to finance both capital and recurrent expenditure (in previous
studies it is permitted to finance investment only), are detailed in the next section.
The model is presented and discussed, with attention to how it relates to and deviates
from the existing literature, in Section II; structural and reduced-form equations are
also derived.  Details of the data and estimation procedures are provided in Section III.
In Section IV the structural equations are estimated using three stage non-linear least
squares with 1956-95 time series data for Pakistan, a country chosen as being a major
aid recipient which has used borrowing to finance consumption, whose public sector
has attracted much attention (Zaman, 1995) and for which a relatively good data set is
available.  We obtain the coefficients of the reduced-form equations using the
estimated coefficients from the structural equations.  Concluding comments are in
Section V.
                                               
1 See, for example, Binh and McGillivray (1993), Gang and Khan (1993), McGillivray (1994), Khan (1994) and
White (1994).4
more concerned with undershooting revenue targets than with overshooting.
However, obtaining revenue has political costs, whether from public objection to
paying taxes or concern with aid dependency, while a revenue shortfall imposes  the
political costs associated with a budget deficit (and/or the opportunity costs of reduced
spending).  There is no reason, a priori, why a revenue shortfall generates more
disutility than a revenue overshoot.  A similar argument applies to expenditures, as the
opportunity cost of overspending is in raising the revenue.  For these reasons, which
the government will take into account when setting targets, we consider the symmetric
form of (2) to be a reasonable representation of U(.).
The specification in (2) differs from all previous fiscal response models by treating aid
as a choice variable for the recipient, and hence endogenous. The general justification
for treating aid as exogenous from the perspective of recipients is that its level is
determined by donors purely on the basis of supply-side criteria, an  issue considered
explicitly in research on the determinants of aid allocation (see, for example,
McGillivray and Oczkowski, 1992). In practice, however, donors commit a certain
amount of aid to recipients each year, and it is ultimately up to recipients to determine
how much of that commitment is disbursed (actually spent) in the year. Although the
aid commitment is determined by the donor and as such is largely exogenous to the
recipient (who can however take some actions to influence commitments), the amount
disbursed, and hence allocated among expenditure categories, is subject to a large
degree of recipient discretion and ought therefore  enter the recipient utility function as
an endogenous variable. Recipients can and do exercise choice over the amounts of aid
disbursed; examination of aid data reveals that disbursements often differ significantly
from commitments (OECD, 1994).
Given this reasoning, A is disbursements while the target A
* can be represented by
commitments. Under-spending an aid commitment in any given year is undesirable as it
implies an inability to utilise all aid (limited absorptive capacity) and may result in
decreased commitments in subsequent years. Overspending is also undesirable as, in
practice, if disbursements exceed commitments it means either delayed spending of
past commitments (suggesting limited absorptive capacity) or, more often, that
emergency aid was granted during the year (thus, it is a proxy for an adverse shock,
such as famine). The estimation of other target variables is discussed in Section III.
Unlike previous applications of the Heller model, we aggregate both aid and
government spending; this deserves some comment.  First, while we have a single
variable G, other contributors tended to distinguish developmental (as a measure of
spending on human capital) from non-developmental public consumption expenditure;6
where (1 - r1) represents savings from the recurrent budget and r2 represents the
proportion of aid allocated to consumption spending. Equations (3) and (4) are of
course a decomposition of the overall public sector budgetary constraint:
B A T G I g + + = + (5)
Previous studies maximised (2) subject to (3) and (4). However, there are three
significant problems with the constraints written in (3) and (4). The first is the
interpretation given by previous studies to r2, which is taken to represent the extent of
fungibility of aid.  In other words, it is implicitly assumed that donors grant aid for
investment purposes only (and that all investment expenditures are captured in Ig)5
hence any aid allocated to G (proportion r2) is an ex post measure of fungibility (i.e.,
r2 = 0 ex ante).  As there are elements of G which donors would be willing to support,
notably various social sector expenditures, r2 > 0 ex ante and the estimated value of r2
is a measure of maximum fungibility.
A second problem is that (3) and (4) do not allow for the not uncommon practice  in
developing countries of financing recurrent expenditure from domestic borrowing.
This can easily be overcome by rewriting (3) with (1-r3)B and adding r3B to the left
hand side of (4). The third problem has been identified by White (1994), who points
out that this representation over-constrains the model, not necessarily allowing the
government to reach a0 even in the case where aid revenue  are sufficient to meet all
targets. The problem arises because although total revenue may be sufficient to meet
(5), the rs constrain allocation so that specific expenditure targets in (2) cannot be
met.
To avoid this problem White (1994) suggested, albeit with some reservation, the use
of a single budget constraint like that written in equation (5). It is obvious that such a
constraint will always ensure that the model can attain a0 when revenues are sufficient
to meet each target. Yet one can question whether (5) alone, which implies no
constraints on how revenues are allocated thus implicitly aid is completely fungible, is
a realistic representation of public sector fiscal behaviour. Public sector fiscal decisions
are subject to pressures from a number of quarters: politicians, private pressure
groups, various arms of the bureaucracy and donors themselves all seek to influence
the allocation of revenues. These pressures, it is reasonable to suggest, inevitably
                                               
5 In fact, although other studies disaggregated G into two components, reflecting concerns we have just discussed,
these were then summed in (4).  Thus, although different types of G were considered as being associated
with different levels of utility, this distinction was not captured in the constraints governing the allocation
of revenues to each type of expenditure.  Thus, in terms of how aid is allocated, our approach does not
differ from that of other studies.11
Results of estimating the structural equations are shown in Table 1.9 Statistically very
good results were obtained, with no computational problems experienced,
convergence achieved with as few as five iterations and, most importantly, with each
of the nine parameters estimated being found to be significantly different from zero at
the 99 percent confidence level or greater. Consider first the estimates of the constraint
equation parameters. The estimates of r1, r2 and r3 are 0.85, 0.51 and 0.54
respectively. It follows from these estimates that 15 percent of tax and other recurrent
revenue has been saved, aid has been allocated almost evenly between consumption
and investment and just under half of domestic borrowing has been allocated to
investment with the balance going to consumption.
Estimates of the remaining structural parameters offer a number of insights. Our main
concern for the moment is the incremental impact of endogenous changes in the
revenue variables, aid especially. These impacts, and the mechanisms through which
they operate, are shown in Table 2. Most of these impacts are negative. Perhaps the
most pertinent result concerns the impact of aid on taxation. As mentioned, there is a
widespread concern that aid may decrease taxation revenue in recipient countries. The
actually seems to the case for Pakistan with respect to endogenous changes in aid, with
each one rupee change in aid money disbursed resulting in a -2.91 rupee change in
taxation. Endogenous changes in aid are also inversely related to changes in
                                               
 9 Corrected functional fits for the structural equations were most satisfactory, ranging from 0.85 to 0.98.
Table 1: Estimates of Structural Equation Parameters










*: significantly different from zero at the 99% level or greater.12
consumption and borrowing. The strongest of these impacts is that on consumption: a
one rupee change in the amount aid disbursed results in a -1.97 change in
consumption.
   Table 2: Direct Incremental Impacts of Revenue Variables
                    Impact                                           Mechanism
Estimate
Aid (A) on Investment (Ig)
Aid (A) on Consumption (G)
Aid (A) on Taxes (T)
Aid (A) on Borrowing (B)
Borrowing (B) on Investment (Ig)
Borrowing (B) on Consumption (G)
Borrowing (B) on Taxes (T)
Borrowing (B) on Aid (A)
Taxes (T) on Aid (A)





















We emphasise that the preceding conclusions are based on estimates of the structural
equation parameters and as such ignore indirect feedback effects operating through the
system. They also refer to the impact of endogenous changes in variables. Of arguable
greater policy relevance is the total (direct and indirect) impact of exogenously
determined changes in revenues. In the case of aid, these (largely) result from decisions
by donors to alter the level of aid commitments to Pakistan. What are the impacts of
these decisions? Answers to this question are provided by the reduced form equation
parameters shown in Table 3 (recall that in our model that A* is the level of aid
commitments).
Judging from p4, a one rupee change in aid commitments results in a total change in
investment expenditure of 0.05 rupees. To this extent aid thus seems to be pro-
investment in Pakistan, albeit only slightly so. Based on our estimates of p8 and p12, a
one rupee change in aid commitments results in a 2.36 rupee decrease in consumption
and an even greater decrease  in taxation and other recurrent revenue of 3.59 rupees.
With respect to this revenue13
one must conclude, therefore,  that the overall impact of aid on this variable is
negative in the Pakistani case, thus confirming the fears of the donor community. An
additional concern is that the results for p4 and p8 taken together suggest that the total
incremental effect of aid on public expenditure is negative. More precisely, each
additional rupee of aid committed by donors to Pakistan results in a 2.31 rupee
decrease in total public expenditure. Worse still, that this decrease is smaller than that
with respect to taxation and other recurrent revenue suggests that the incremental
impact of aid on public sector saving is negative. The implication is that aid has
worsened a dependence on external forms of finance in so far as the public sector is
concerned. This implication become even more serious if one considers our estimate of
p20, which indicates each additional rupee of aid results in an 0.88 rupee increase in
domestic borrowing. While disconcerting, this result is contrary to what one may
(perhaps naively) expect a priori. That is, as aid and domestic borrowing are
alternative forms of revenue, an increase in one would be expected to lead to a






















decrease in the other. Finally, given our estimate of p16, a one rupee change in aid
commitments results in a 0.4 rupee change in the amount of aid actually disbursed.
This result is precisely what one would expect: the international donor community
provides additional aid money for Pakistan to disburse, and this results in an increase
in the amount of aid disbursed and vice versa.
V      CONCLUSION
This paper offers a number of advances to the literature on fiscal response models of
aid impact, predicated on the premise that the appropriate way to analyse the impact of
aid is to assess how aid, which is granted to the government, affects government fiscal
behaviour. The model developed here diverges from previous applications of the
Heller (1975) model in a number of respects.  First, aid is endogenised in the
recognition that developing countries have discretion over the aid money actually
allocated among various expenditure items. Second, the model allows for domestic
borrowing to finance recurrent consumption expenditure.  Third, influences which limit
the ability of a government to allocate revenues in the optimal (utility maximising)
manner desired are incorporated through the use of an  inequality constraint; if this is
binding, governments are restricted to constrained utility maximisation.  We believe
the model, its many simplifications notwithstanding, captures important features of
government fiscal behaviour, and is appropriate for analysing the impact of aid.
The model was applied to 1956-95 time series data for Pakistan.  One important
finding was that about half of aid was allocated to government consumption; while in
some respects this may seem high, if one believes that all aid is intended for (physical
capital) investment, critics have often claimed that aid is ineffective because virtually
all is allocated to consumption.  The reduced form parameters provide estimates of
the total impact of aid, and despite the finding regarding the allocation of aid it was
found that the overall effect of aid on consumption was negative. While aid was found
to have slightly positive total incremental impact on investment, its overall incremental
impact on public expenditure was found to be negative. This also seems to be the case
with the effect of aid on taxation, but to a greater extent. To this extent, a concern of
the donor community is justified with respect to Pakistan. These results, combined
with that suggesting that the total incremental impact of aid on domestic borrowing is
positive, paint a generally rather gloomy picture of the impact of aid on the behaviour
of Pakistan’s public sector.15
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